Scaling Up Proactive Enforcement

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
Dmitriy Traytel


International Conference on Computer-Aided Verification — Zagreb, July 23, 2025







Forest of software

















Our new runtime enforcement tool























First-Order Runtime Enforcement




Real-Time First-Order Runtime Enforcement



Proactive Real-Time First-Order Runtime Enforcement



Proactive Real-Time First-Order Runtime Enforcement



Let $x \in \mathbb{V}$ be a variable, $c \in \mathbb{C}$ be a constant, $e \in \mathbb{E}$ be an event and $I \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$ be an interval,

$$\begin{array}{ll} t & ::= & x \mid c \\ \varphi & ::= & e(t,\dots,t) \mid \top \mid \neg \varphi \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \mid \\ & & \exists x. \; \varphi \mid \forall x. \; \varphi \mid \bullet_{I} \varphi \mid \bigcirc_{I} \varphi \mid \varphi \mathcal{S}_{I} \varphi \mid \varphi \mathcal{U}_{I} \varphi \end{array}$$

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Syntax

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- Notation "always ϕ ": $\Box \phi \equiv \neg (\top \mathcal{U}_{[0,\infty)} \neg \phi)$

Last year in Montréal (CAV'24)

First algorithm & tool for Proactive Real-Time First-Order Enforcement

- 1. EMFOTL, an enforceable fragment of MFOTL
- 2. Enforcement algorithm for EMFOTL
- 3. WhyEnf enforcement tool

Limitations:

- Expressiveness: "only" basic MFOTL
- ▶ Performance: 1–2 OOMs slower than monitors

Proactive Real-Time First-Order Enforcement



François Hublet¹, Leonardo Lima², David Basin¹, Srdan Krstić¹, and Dmitriy Traytel²



¹ ETH Zürich, Zurich, Switzerland (francois hublet, basin, srdan.kratic@inf.ethz.c ² University of Copenhagen, Denmark (leonardo, traytel)@ii.ku.dk

Abstract. Modern detwee systems must comply with her resimilarly map plear regalations in decisions recipility from individual automation to discuss protection. Restition calcineromate allocations that challenge by empowering the approximation of the control of the control of the control of the control of the surgery systems by sunling their actions to many neglect compliance. We propose a newed approach to the practice real-time enforcement of two control of the various as we system and, difficult on approach MOTE. Engone this is enforced also in the standed, such develops a sound enforcement algorithm and carry and a reas where the control of the control of the control on out-officer of all points from the study is real-time with modest control of control or all points from the study is real-time with modest control of control or control of the co

 $\textbf{Keywords}: \ \text{runtime enforcement} \ \cdot \ \text{temporal logic} \ \cdot \ \text{obligations}$

1 Introduction

As modern software systems become increasingly complex, they are required to comply with a myriad of growingly intricate regulations. The ability to monitor and control such systems is an important, technically challenging task.

Bustime references [5] tacks this problem by observing and controlling a test system under setting (SSG), but that the tests, possibly modified, complywith a given policy. Bustime references is performed by a component calculwrith a given policy. The anticome the problem of the component calculration of the component of the component calculated and the control of the control of the an inherently under problem preference during the SSS's encertain. When time an inherently under problem preference during the SSS's encertain. When time an inherently under the component of the control of the control of the problem than resultine considering [6], where the SSS is only observed and policy violations are reported, but not prevented. Applications of number control on the control of the results of the control of the control of the control of the control of the results of the control of the contro

Policies can be decomposed into provisions and obligations [37]. Compliance with provisions depends on past and present SuS behavior, and it is sufficient for an enforce to pract to the current SuS action. Compliance with obligations.

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1. We extend our approach to support more expressive specifications

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 - Novel benchmark set
 - Improved performance: 1 OOM speed-up over previous work

Function symbols $f \in \mathbb{F}$ each associated with a computable function $\hat{f}: \mathbb{D}^{a(f)} \to \mathbb{D}$. Standard semantics given a valuation $v: \mathbb{V} \to \mathbb{D}$:

$$[\![c]\!]_v = c \qquad \qquad [\![x]\!]_v = v(x) \qquad \qquad [\![f(t_1,\ldots,t_{a(f)})]\!]_v = \hat{f}([\![t_1]\!]_v,\ldots,[\![t_{a(f)}]\!]_v)$$

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$$\vdash \phi : \mathsf{PG}^+(x) \Longrightarrow \mathsf{if} \ \mathsf{v}, \mathsf{i} \models_{\sigma} \phi, \mathsf{then} \ \mathsf{v}(x) \ \mathsf{must} \ \mathsf{be} \ \mathsf{in} \ \sigma \ \mathsf{with} \ \mathsf{time-point} \le \mathsf{i}$$

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Definition: Monitorability

A closed MFOTL formula ϕ is *monitorable* iff for any of its quantified subformulae Qx. ψ , where $Q \in \{\forall, \exists\}$, either $\vdash \psi : \mathsf{PG}^+(x)$, or $\vdash \psi : \mathsf{PG}^-(x)$, or x does not appear in any function argument in ψ .

Functions: Enforceability – EMFOTL (CAV'24)

► Typing judgements $\Gamma \vdash \phi : \mathbb{C}$ (" ϕ can be made true") or $\Gamma \vdash \phi : \mathbb{S}$ (" ϕ can be made false") + $\Gamma : \mathbb{E} \to \{\mathbb{C}, \mathbb{S}\}$ fixes events that the enforcer will cause or suppress

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- ► (Selected) rules

$$\frac{\Gamma(e) = \mathbb{C} \quad e \in \mathbb{C}}{\Gamma \vdash e(t_1, \dots, t_{a(e)}) : \mathbb{C}} \quad \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{C}} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \psi : \mathbb{C}}{\Gamma \vdash \phi \to \psi : \mathbb{C}} \to^{\mathbb{C}R}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \phi : \mathbb{C}}{\Gamma \vdash \Box \phi : \mathbb{C}} \quad \Box^{\mathbb{C}} \qquad \frac{\vdash \phi : \mathsf{PG}^{-}(x) \quad \Gamma \vdash \phi : \mathbb{C}}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x. \phi : \mathbb{C}} \quad \forall^{\mathbb{C}}$$

$$\begin{split} &\frac{\Gamma(e) = \mathbb{C}}{\Gamma \vdash e(t_1, \dots, t_{a(e)}) : \mathbb{C}} \ \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{C}} & \frac{\Gamma \vdash \psi : \mathbb{C}}{\Gamma \vdash \phi \to \psi : \mathbb{C}} \to^{\mathbb{C}R} \\ &\frac{\Gamma \vdash \phi : \mathbb{C}}{\Gamma \vdash \Box \phi : \mathbb{C}} \ \Box^{\mathbb{C}} & \frac{\vdash \phi : \mathsf{PG}(x)^{-} \quad \Gamma \vdash \phi : \mathbb{C}}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x. \phi : \mathbb{C}} \ \forall^{\mathbb{C}} \end{split}$$

Does this work with functions?

$$\begin{split} &\frac{\Gamma(\mathbf{e}) = \mathbb{C} \quad \mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{C}}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{e}(\mathbf{t}_1, \dots, \mathbf{t}_{\mathbf{a}(\mathbf{e})}) : \mathbb{C}} \quad \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{C}} \qquad \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \psi : \mathbb{C}}{\Gamma \vdash \phi \to \psi : \mathbb{C}} \to^{\mathbb{C}R} \\ &\frac{\Gamma \vdash \phi : \mathbb{C}}{\Gamma \vdash \Box \phi : \mathbb{C}} \quad \Box^{\mathbb{C}} \qquad \qquad \frac{\vdash \phi : \mathsf{PG}(\mathbf{x})^{-} \quad \Gamma \vdash \phi : \mathbb{C}}{\Gamma \vdash \forall \mathbf{x}. \phi : \mathbb{C}} \quad \forall^{\mathbb{C}} \end{split}$$

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$$\square(\forall x.\ A(x) \to B(x+1)) \qquad \qquad \checkmark \qquad \qquad \text{Cause } B(x+1) \text{ for each } A(x)$$

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Does this work with functions? Assume A, B $\in \mathbb{C}$.

Observe: events that guard x, functions that can generate infinitely many values, functions that can generate only finitely many values

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Observe: events that guard x, functions that can generate infinitely many values, functions that can generate only finitely many values \rightarrow the problem is the interaction guard + 'unstable' functions

Solution: If A(x) is used as a guard, prevent A(t) to be caused if t contains 'unstable' functions.

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Definition: Stable function

Let \preceq be a well-founded relation on \mathbb{D} . A function $f: \mathbb{D}^k \to \mathbb{D}$ is \preceq -stable iff there exists a finite $C_f \subseteq \mathbb{D}$ such that for any $d_{\mathsf{sup}} \in \mathbb{D}$ and $d_1, \ldots, d_{a(f)} \preceq d_{\mathsf{sup}}$, either $f(d_1, \ldots, d_{a(f)}) \preceq d_{\mathsf{sup}}$ or $f(d_1, \ldots, d_{a(f)}) \in C_f$.

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Functions: Enforceability (cont'd)

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- \rightarrow details in the paper

Implementation

New open-source tool





- ► Code base: ~10k loc (OCaml)
- ► Includes optimizations → details in paper

Evaluation

- RQ1. Can EnfGuard's EMFOTL fragment formalize real-world policies?
- RQ2. At what maximum event rate can ENFGUARD perform real-time enforcement?
- RQ3. Does EnfGuard's performance improve upon the state-of-the-art?

		Log statistics			Formulae statistics				Tool support				
Name	Real	#logs	max log	$\max er$	$\max \varphi $	let bindings	Aggregations	Functions	# formulae	ENFGUARD	WHYENF	ENFPOLY	MonPoly
GDPR	✓	1	5,631	10^{-4}	72				6	6	6	2	6
$\operatorname{GPDR}^{\operatorname{FUN}}$	✓	1	5,631	10^{-4}	108			~	6	6			
NOKIA	✓	1	9,458,824	109	44			✓	11	11	11	5	11
IC	✓	3	634,789	147	179	\checkmark		\checkmark	8	8			8
AGG		2	100,000		34		✓	\checkmark	6	6			6
CLUSTER		1	5,000		42	\checkmark	e	\checkmark	2	2			
								Total:	39	39	17	7	31
					Rewriting required:						no	yes	yes

The largest benchmark suite for runtime enforcement!

Evaluation: Expressiveness (RQ1)

ENFGUARD supports more policies (39/39) than the SOTA MFOTL monitor MonPoly [Basin et al., 2017] (31/39) and significantly more than WhyEnf (17/39).

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"Block validation latency" (from 1c benchmark [Basin et al., 2023])

```
LET node_added_to_subnet(node_id, node_addr, subnet) = ... IN
  LET node_removed_from_subnet(node_id, node_addr) = ... IN
  LET in subnet(node id, node addr, subnet) = ... IN
  LET subnet_size(subnet_id, n) = ... IN
  LET block_added(node_id, subnet_id, block, t_add) = ... IN
  LET validated(block, subnet id, t add) =
    EXISTS n validated, n subnet. (n validated <- CNT (valid node; block, subnet id, t add; ...)
      AND subnet size (subnet id. n subnet)
      AND (float_of_int(n_validated) > 2. *. float_of_int(n_subnet) /. 3.) IN
  LET time per block(block, subnet id, time) = ... IN
  LET subnet type assoc(subnet id. subnet type) = ... IN
12 LET subnet type map(subnet id, subnet type) = ... IN
13 FORALL block, subnet id, time.
    time per block(block, subnet id, time)
    AND ((subnet_type_map(subnet_id, "System") AND (time > 3000))
    OR ((subnet_type_map(subnet_id, "Application")
16
    OR subnet type map(subnet id. "VerifiedApplication")) AND (time > 1000)))
  IMPLIES alert validation latency (block, subnet id, time)
```

Event rate er: number of events **in the trace** per time unit (timestamp time)

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- ► Acceleration a = trace timestamp step / real time step

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- ightharpoonup max $_{\ell}(a)$: maximum latency at acceleration a
- ▶ Real-time condition: $\max_{\ell}(a) \le 1/a$
- ▶ We report avg_{er} at the maximum latency fulfilling the real-time condition

Comparison with WhyEnf, EnfPoly [Hublet et al., 2022], MonPoly (monitor).

Note: EnfPoly covers only 7/39 formulae.

GPDR benchmarks:

	E	nfGuar	RD.		WhyEni	?]	EnfPoly			МопРо	LY
Policy ϕ	$ \phi $ avg $_{ m er}$	avg_ℓ	max_ℓ	avg_{er}	avg_ℓ	max_ℓ	avg_{er}	avg_ℓ	max_ℓ	avg_{er}	avg_ℓ	max_ℓ
consent	22 1619	.39	2	101	7.6	30	6480	.17	1	6934	.20	1
deletion	$14 \ 3238$.28	2	3238	.20	1				6934	.20	1
gdpr	72 810	.87	3	25	33	110				3465	.13	1
information	16 1619	.33	2	810	1.1	5.2				6934	.15	1
lawfulness	17 1619	.35	2	810	1.3	4.4	6480	.17	1	6934	.15	1
sharing	19 1619	.32	2	405	3.0	15				6934	.20	1

Consistent findings on other benchmarks (not shown here):

- ► ENFGUARD 2-10× faster than WHYENF
- ► Slightly slower but much better coverage than ENFPOLY
- ▶ Difference with MonPoly: PDT- rather than table-based

Thank you for your attention!

If you are interested in this work, feel free to drop us an e-mail:

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Scaling Up Proactive Enforcement



François Hublet¹, Leonardo Lima², David Basin¹, Srdan Krstic¹, and Dmitriv Travtei²

ETH Zirich, Zurich, Switzerland
(francois.hublet, basis, srdan.kratic)@inf.ethz.ch
 University of Copenhagen, Doenmark
(Leonardo, traytel)@di.ks.dk

Abstract. Bustine enforces review events from a system and output cummands ensuring be entirely policy compliance. Presentive adversations and the entirely control of the entirely control of the time, called only as a requirem to system actions. However, practice or forces here of at least compared to system actions. However, practice or forces here of at least compared to system actions. However, practice or forces have of at least compared to the control of the entirely control of the entirely control of the entirely control of the Very present a performance-optimized, practice enforces to all applications of the entirely control of the entirely control of the enpire time and the entirely control of the entirely control of the enpire time and entirely control of the entirely control of the enpire time and entirely control of the entirely control of the enpirely control of the entirely control of the entirely control to the entirely control of the entirely cont

1 Introduction

Suitable verifying the behavior of large, complex systems in time in quadratic and an advantage matter discovered like an inversiged as family of refensions and ad advantage and correcting the behavior of system during their exercision and advantage of the state o

	1.1: events	_
SuE	1.2: (reactive) command	
	2.2: (proactive) command	Enforcer

policy P1.1, 2.1: time τ

Fig. 1: Communication diagram for enforcement. R-step: 1.1, 1.2; P-step: 2.1, 2.2

Thank you for your attention!

If you are interested in this work, feel free to drop us an e-mail:

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Any questions?





Scaling Up Proactive Enforcement



François Hublet¹, Leonardo Lima², David Basin¹, Srdan Krstić¹, and Dmitriy Traytel²

ETH Zirich, Zurich, Switzerland
(francois hublet, basin, srdan.krstic)@inf.eths.ch
 University of Copenhagen, Denmark
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Abstract. Bustine enforces review events from a system and output cummands controlled posterior jedicy compliance. Presative address, commands to present present present present present present time, relief endry as a response to system actions. However, practicly enforces here are far their appears to response to postern actions. However, practicly enforces here are far their appears to response to helder that adaption, and with the existing tools post performance, helder that adaption, the control of their adaption of their analysis of their adaption. The control of their articles of their art

1 Introduction

Statisty certifying the behavior of large, complex systems is often ingonished as an abereative, random enforcement [III] has converged as a finally offer (cliniques aimed at downing and correcting the behavior of options during their execution and of abovering and correcting the behavior of options are desirable and the convergence of the control of a system and converse the enhancement of a system material real system are desirable and (Sigh) through the segment of execut that occur in it and sends commands to the Sigh it complex younghous Circles [Tipe 1]. These commands interest the system to suppress, commands immediately upon receiving events (Figure III) interestina [1,1-12], in practice enforcement [III], the enforcer on administrating por commands immediately upon receiving events (Figure III) interestina [1,1-12]. In practice enforcement, [III], the enforcer on administrating por commands are 1,1-12]. This is upon the enforcement of the control of the cont

	1.1: events	
SuE	1.2: (reactive) command	
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